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This chapter explores emotional responses to child-killing in early modern 
England and Wales.1 Of unnatural infant deaths, newborn child murder 
has received the greatest attention in historical scholarship, particularly 
neonatal infanticide prosecuted under the 1624 Concealment Act.2 The 
premise of this statute was that unmarried women who concealed their 
pregnancies, murdered their newborn infants, and secretly disposed of the 
bodies avoided conviction by claiming stillbirth. Concealment of death 
rather than homicide thus became the fact to be determined in law.3
The infanticidal mother’s story—or, at least, the unfolding of events 
that culminated in prosecution under the Concealment Act—is well 
known. It is a tale in which emotions are central: shame, isolation and 
fear on her part and disapproval and contempt on that of neighbours and 
legal  officials. It is also a story of progress in which again emotions play a 
key role. An increased acquittal rate in the eighteenth century is explained 
in terms of the development of modern sensibilities, which led juries to 
become more sympathetic to defendants. This attribution of ‘modern’ 
feelings to eighteenth-century people is extended, perhaps inadvertently, 
to women accused of infanticide across the period. By imposing upon 
the infanticidal mother a subjective experience that may be similar to that 
which we could imagine for ourselves, we run the risk of distancing our-
selves from other historical subjects: the people who prosecuted them 
and the infants who were deprived of life. A question arises, therefore, 
of whose emotions the historiography of infanticide has so far privileged.
Here, I examine anew contemporary attitudes towards women sus-
pected of killing infants and to discovering infant corpses; I end by revisit-
ing how we may approach the subjectivities of accused women. Drawing 
on late sixteenth-, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English and Welsh 
sources, I show that emotional reactions to child-killing were complex and 
variable. Such responses cannot be reduced to a narrative in which pre-
modern harshness was replaced by modern empathy.
The InfanTIcIdal MoTher’s sTory
In February 1734, Jane Williams confessed before magistrates that three 
weeks earlier she had been ‘delivered of a female bastard, born dead’ in her 
house in north Wales. Alone during her labour, she afterwards buried the 
child in an ‘aisle in the said dwelling house privately, without acquainting 
any person about it’.4 Jane was convicted at the Montgomeryshire Great 
Sessions (the Welsh equivalent of the English Assizes) and sentenced to 
hang. Any modern scholar is likely to fashion from Jane’s brief confes-
sion a variant of a generic story constructed in the shadow of the 1624 
Concealment Act. A woman who found herself pregnant and abandoned 
by the father of the child, fearing the censure of her community, concealed 
the signs of pregnancy and told no one. She gave birth alone with neither 
practical nor emotional support. Afterwards, whether the child had been 
stillborn, survived for minutes or hours, or died by neglect or her own 
hand, she secretly disposed of its body. The discovery of the corpse pre-
cipitated a search for the mother, who was identified by material signs of 
childbirth on bed-linen or elsewhere, by visible changes in her body, or 
other seemingly incriminating behaviour. The woman was interrogated 
by magistrates who took sworn statements from witnesses, and thereafter 
tried at the Assizes or Great Sessions where she was convicted, effectively, 
of murder. She died on the gallows, or narrowly escaped with her life, a 
victim of a patriarchal society in which the shame of bearing an illegitimate 
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child compelled her to murder her newborn babe or allow it to die. So 
the story goes.5
We may construct such a story in Jane Williams’s case. Several female 
neighbours deposed that Jane, who had recently grown so ‘very big’, 
suspiciously emerged much ‘smaller’ after a period of supposed sickness 
during which she stayed home and refused visitors. Jane initially denied 
everything. She displayed her breast to local women when asked to do so 
but would not allow them to ‘draw or suck a little’ to confirm whether 
she was lactating, which she seemed to be. Fearing the worst, the women 
informed magistrates, who sanctioned a search of Jane’s house. There the 
women opened a linen cloth, ominously pinned shut, which revealed ‘the 
marks or sign of the birth of a child’ and the bloody stains made by ‘a 
lying-in woman’. Eventually, Jane admitted that she had been delivered of 
a dead baby and told them where to find it.
What can we really know of the subjectivities of those involved? 
Williams entered the historical record solely due to this episode: she is 
refracted through the traces of these events in the legal record. The tran-
script of her examination is merely a few lines long. It says literally nothing 
about her subjective experience of pregnancy, childbirth, the dead baby 
or what she did with its body. When we read Jane’s examination and her 
neighbours’ depositions, we nonetheless imagine what they must have felt 
and thought. We construct from these fragments a story by filling rather 
a lot of gaps (or filling gaps with rather a lot). Our assumptions about the 
thoughts and feelings of women accused of infanticide are not spun from 
thin air, of course, but arise from our engagement with evidence and other 
stories we have read or heard. Yet the perspective from which we approach 
such evidence perhaps privileges the telling of one type of story over other 
ways of understanding it historically (see also discussion in Chap. 4).
An unintended consequence of modern scholars’ empathy for infan-
ticidal mothers and condemnation of the Concealment Act has been to 
sensationalise the topic. Illegitimate pregnancy is frequently depicted as a 
circumstance in which a girl stood to lose everything: her livelihood, her 
home, her reputation, her friends, her future. Infanticide was an ‘inevi-
table’ response to the ‘intolerable’ shame or ‘practical impossibility’ of 
rearing a bastard.6 Suspected women are assumed by most historians to 
have been guilty. Certainly, some women confessed that they had acted 
‘in hope to keep it private and herself from further shame, and to keep the 
grief and shame of it from her friends’.7 Yet a simultaneous assumption of 
both guilt and blamelessness hinders our understanding of meaning for 
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contemporaries. For early modern people were aware that infanticide did 
not inevitably or usually follow an illegitimate pregnancy.
First, bastardy was commonplace and infanticide was not. By the early 
seventeenth century, long-term demographic growth had resulted in ‘a 
brutal deterioration’ in opportunities to marry and form households.8 
Bridal pregnancy remained high—some 25 per cent of married couples’ 
first-born children were conceived before marriage—and bastardy rates 
increased. Of every hundred live births, between two and five were ille-
gitimate, though precise figures varied over time, region, even parish to 
parish. In Wales and in western and northern England, the illegitimacy 
rate could be twice that of the east and south.9 But there was unlikely to 
be a single parish anywhere in which inhabitants did not know someone 
who had given birth to, fathered, or was a bastard.
Second, and conversely, most people never knew an infanticide in their 
own parish in their lifetime. Richard Gough, for instance, identified 16 
bastards (and suspected at least four more) among the inhabitants of his 
Shropshire parish at the turn of the eighteenth century, but he recalled 
no suspected infanticide.10 In 1763, Great Sessions judges noted that 
Margaret Evans’ trial for concealment was the first in Caernarvonshire 
‘within the memory of the eldest person’;11 the last case 34 years before 
had not reached trial after the Grand Jury threw out the indictment.12 
Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Welsh counties saw on average one 
prosecution every four to seven years, which constituted less than 2 per 
cent of felonies.13 In the counties of north-western and north-eastern 
England, there was rarely more than one prosecution every two to four 
years. Even in the south-east, there might be less than one annually; in 
densely populated Essex, 86 per cent of parishes saw no-one prosecuted 
for infanticide ever.14 In London, where all crimes were more numerous, 
the Old Bailey Sessions Papers reported an average of two cases annually 
between 1674 and 1750, amounting to 0.7 per cent of homicides and 
felonious property crimes combined.15 In short, most individuals did not 
know personally a single person tried for newborn child murder.
Third, unexplained deaths of newborns were not necessarily suspicious, 
even when mothers were unmarried, given infant mortality rates. Of every 
hundred babies born alive in the seventeenth century, two died within 
a day, four in the first week and up to ten within a month. In London’s 
 poorest areas, infant mortality was around 30 per cent.16 London’s General 
Bill of Mortality for 1702 listed only ten murders of victims of all ages, 
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but 513 infants stillborn and a further 90 who perished by unintentional 
overlaying by parents or nurses.17 Weekly Bills of Mortality present a simi-
lar picture: for example, in one week in April 1715, nine infants were still-
born and one was overlain; in January 1720, 12 were stillborn and two 
overlain.18
Elizabeth Cellier’s proposal for a foundling hospital and midwives’ cor-
poration in 1687 estimated that during the preceding two decades more 
than 13,000 babies had been stillborn and a further 5000 had died before 
baptism—these included children born outside marriage, but were distin-
guished from those ‘willfully murdered by their wicked and cruel mothers, 
for want of fit ways to conceal their shame, and provide for their chil-
dren’.19 Even when unmarried women were suspected, coroners’ inquests 
did not always conclude that a crime had been committed.20
High infant mortality rates did not, however, result in dead babies 
being objects of emotional indifference.21 Early modern people expressed 
genuine concerns about the spiritual well-being of such infants. Thus, 
after Ann ferch John had confessed and her baby’s body viewed, two 
other women washed the child, put it in a linen cloth, and carried it to 
the churchyard, where it was ‘buried by one Richard Mathew, the clerk 
of the parish […] without a minister’.22 The notion that chrisom children 
(who died before baptism) did not enter heaven could make newborn 
child murder seem especially heartless, as could contemporary medical 
theories that newborn bodies were incredibly sensitive to pain and should 
be handled gently.23
Some historians have spoken of an early modern ‘infanticide wave’, or 
‘infanticide craze’, which made newborn child murder prosecuted under 
the Concealment Act ‘one of the distinctive offences’ of the period (see 
also Chap. 4).24 Yet in the context of bastardy, infant mortality and other 
prosecutions for homicide and felonious crime, infanticide or concealment 
of infant death was absolutely and relatively rare. Neonaticide was clearly 
not a default path for unmarried pregnant women, even when marriage 
to the child’s father was impossible. Of course, individuals’ lack of direct 
experience of infanticide does not itself mean that it was not a prevalent 
social issue. Yet I shall argue below that responses to the realities of infanti-
cide do not suggest that people were gripped by a widespread moral panic, 
despite the concerns of some Members of Parliament in 1624.
The narrative of progress that informs much infanticide historiography 
has also had implications for the way scholars have imagined the emotions 
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of those touched by child-killing. While some continuities and ‘remark-
able parallels’ with the seventeenth century have been noted, similarities 
tend largely to be identified from the mid-eighteenth century onward. In 
particular, a high acquittal rate has been attributed to the development 
of modern sensibilities: new attitudes of pity and compassion towards 
accused women; reappraisals of medical evidence, and the tightening up of 
rules of evidence in the courtroom. In this account of change, eighteenth- 
century juries’ new-found understanding that defendants ‘deserved more 
sympathy than censure’ made them less willing to convict. In contrast, it 
is assumed that seventeenth-century ‘[s]ociety … assumed that all unmar-
ried pregnant women were lewd and sinful and thus inclined to indulge 
in the barbaric and unnatural act of baby-slaying’, and ‘both prosecu-
tion and conviction rates were high’ as the 1624 statute was ‘effective[ly] 
implement[ed]’.25 From such a perspective, the Concealment Act and 
those who implemented it in the seventeenth century seem draconian, 
ruthless and cruel.26 Scholars typically characterise those involved in pros-
ecutions in restricted, dichotomous terms. The editors of a Special Issue 
dedicated to the history of British infanticide presented only two options: 
‘Was infanticide [either] regarded with fear and loathing, as we might 
expect, or was … [it] accepted as a form of extreme population control?’27 
But people’s emotional responses to newborn child murder and the con-
cealment of bastard deaths cannot be reduced simply to utter abhorrence 
or complete acceptance or indifference.
Conceiving attitudes to newborn child murder and its prosecution 
in terms of a ‘harsh’ seventeenth and ‘lenient’ eighteenth century dis-
torts our understanding of the past. Not only, as Mark Jackson observed, 
were attitudes to women accused of newborn child murder at the end 
of the eighteenth century ‘more heterogeneous, and often more hostile’ 
than the ‘humanitarian’ narrative of change allows,28 but we must also 
reconsider our view of the seventeenth century. The notions that unmar-
ried women concealed their pregnancies due to their modesty and virtue 
rather than an unnatural cruelty, and that they deserved pity rather than 
condemnation were not new in 1750 nor even in 1700. These ideas 
coexisted during the entire period in which the Concealment Act was 
on the statute books. That is not to say that nothing changed between 
1624 and 1803 but rather to suggest that the dichotomous, teleological 
view of both the infanticidal mother and attitudes to child-killing will 
not suffice.
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condeMnaTIon and coMpassIon
If the killing of innocent babes was genuinely shocking and was associ-
ated with unmarried women who concealed pregnancies, we might expect 
to find it a common topic of discourses that railed against sin and crime. 
Certainly, preachers such as William Gouge denounced neonaticidal 
mothers of bastards as ‘lewd and unnatural’, while the authors of legal 
tracts identified such women as ‘harlots’ and ‘lewd whores’.29 Popular 
genres of cheap print fleshed out the infanticidal mother’s story under 
sensationalist titles, following the route from routine sinfulness to the 
murder of an innocent babe, to the providential discovery of the crime, 
and thence to trial and punishment. Thus, a ballad No Natural Mother but 
a Monster (1634) charted a young woman’s journey from disobedience, 
‘unbridled will’ and ‘wild’ behaviour, via fornication to hidden pregnancy, 
secret birth, and strangling her ‘poor harmless infant quite against nature’s 
law’, to discovery and execution. The ballad ends with her lamenting her 
‘barbarous wickedness that foully did transgress thus against nature’ as she 
waited, penitently, for death. ‘Let not’, she exhorted listeners, ‘the fear of 
shame so prevail ... as to win you the name of cruel mother’, who is ‘more 
cruel’ than ‘savage creatures’ such as snakes and tigers.30
The 1624 legislation did not create such rhetoric but was informed by 
it. Anthony Munday similarly described in 1580 a maidservant who ‘had 
abused her body with unchaste living, and being delivered of a sweet and 
tender infant, calling all motherly and natural affection from her; buried 
the same alive’.31 One of the two murders tried at the Old Bailey in July 
1614, which were the subject of a pamphlet Deeds against Nature and 
Monsters by Kinde, was that by ‘a lascivious young damsel’, who, so ‘that 
the world might not see the seed of her own shame’, took ‘the poor tender 
babe as it were new dropped from [her] womb, and not like a mother, but 
a monster threw it down into a loathsome privy house, therein to give it an 
undecent grave’.32 Such condemnations and the 1624 Act itself have led 
some scholars to remark that the early modern ‘popular press show[ed] 
an almost obsessive concern with female violence’, and that ‘unmarried 
mothers [were] considered the most prolific killers and certainly the most 
vilified’.33
However, neither popular crime literature nor its terminology was 
especially associated with women prosecuted for concealment or neonati-
cide. Indeed, the first murder discussed in Deeds against Nature was that 
of a man who strangled his wife ‘to hide his shame and lust’. He too was 
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‘a Monster by kind and the doer of a deed against nature’.34 Of numer-
ous crime pamphlets written by prison chaplain, Henry Goodcole, only 
one concerned women who murdered their own offspring. In Natures 
Cruel Step-Dames: or, Matchless Monsters of the Female Sex, Goodcole was 
primarily interested in Elizabeth Barnes, a widow who slit her eight-year- 
old daughter’s throat while she was sleeping, having taken the child deep 
into the woods for a picnic (apple pie, herring pie, raisins, and other fruits, 
the same delicious ‘baits, used by loving parents to quiet and still their 
children in their unquietness’). Goodcole discussed Barnes’ behaviour and 
its meaning over 16 pages. Anne Willis, who had thrown her newborn 
bastard into the privy, he dealt with in a single page.35
Unlike other relatively rare violent offences associated with women, 
such as petty treason and witchcraft, neonaticide was not a prevalent 
theme in street literature. The explanation is not, as some have suggested, 
that a high incidence of newborn child murder rendered it too ‘mun-
dane’ and typical to excite a public used to reading about more sensa-
tional killings.36 For, as we have seen, neonaticide was neither mundane 
nor typical. Concealment of pregnancy and the deaths of illegitimate new-
borns were not well suited to the crime narrative genre for other reasons. 
Notwithstanding the portrayal of infanticidal mothers as lewd, sinful crea-
tures, such women were also culturally the objects of some sympathy.
The most obvious reason for this is ambivalence towards the 
Concealment Act itself. As I have shown elsewhere, contemporaries dis-
tinguished between cases based on positive evidence of murder that met 
standards of proof in regular homicide law, and those which rested solely 
upon concealment of death. The Act thus had a low conviction rate and 
convicted women were far more likely to be reprieved and pardoned than 
they were for any other category of homicide. Crucially, this was not 
an eighteenth-century development, but began in the 1620s almost as 
soon as the statute came into force.37 After the Old Bailey trial jury found 
Elizabeth Draper guilty in 1626, for example, efforts to secure her pardon 
included the coroner, the midwife, the surgeon and the jury foreman all 
certifying that the coroner’s jury ‘would not find her guilty at all’ despite 
pressure from the coroner, because ‘the evidence touch[ed] merely the 
concealment of the statute’, and ‘the midwife swore the child was born 
dead and the surgeon could not find any wound or bruise’.38 In other 
words, without positive evidence that the infant had been murdered, the 
jury were reluctant to find Draper guilty even though technically the evi-
dence for concealing the death met the criteria for conviction.
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Reprieves and pardons were frequently based on same pretext: when 
evidence pertained to concealment alone and ‘not actual nor malicious 
killings’.39 Many such pardons were, significantly, free pardons, not condi-
tional upon transportation or other mitigated punishment. It was as a devel-
opment of these practical rejections of the strict terms of the Concealment 
Act from the 1620s onwards that the ‘linen defence’ emerged, whereby 
preparations for the infant’s arrival such as the provision of clothes and 
linens became accepted as one of the ‘divers circumstances’ that ‘made 
it probable that the child was stillborn’ and which very often resulted in 
acquittal regardless of concealment.40
Sympathy for unmarried women prosecuted for neonaticide was con-
nected also to their entire predicament. The conventional script which 
provokes empathy of modern scholars had a similar effect on many con-
temporaries. The Old Bailey Proceedings described Joan Blackwell as ‘an 
object of Compassion to most People present’ at her 1679 trial. The ‘poor 
young Wench’, who had been ‘betrayed … by a promise of marriage’, 
was thrown out and physically forced into another parish by her landlady 
while she was actually in labour: ‘this poor Creature’ gave birth ‘in this 
sad condition in the street, and without any help’. Watchmen found her 
thus, ‘lying as one half dead’, and a midwife called to the scene found the 
child dead but not separated from Joan’s body. Joan herself did not claim 
stillbirth—she said she had heard the baby cry—but insisted she had not 
killed it. Both the Proceedings and the Ordinary’s Account, in which read-
ers learned of her reprieve, suggested that ‘the poor creature … was con-
victed only upon the severity of the Statute’.41 Pity was directed towards 
women presumed to have killed their babies, not just those whose guilt was 
doubtful. A trial pamphlet author in 1664 described Mary Smith, who had 
decapitated her newborn baby, thrown its body out of a ship’s porthole 
and hidden its head in the hold, as a ‘bloody mother’ yet also lamented 
that ‘never came a more penitent soul within the walls of Newgate, than 
this poor creature’.42 Mr Bay, a parish officer, used the same phrase when 
he testified against Mary Shrewsbury in 1737, even though by then he 
was aware that she had hacked at her newborn infant’s throat so violently 
that its head was almost severed from the body and had afterwards sewn 
its corpse into a cloth. Called to her house after she had confessed, Bay 
had found ‘the poor creature … sitting upright in her bed, with a book in 
her hand, and the tears ran plentifully down her face’.43 In the early mod-
ern period, the term ‘poor creature’ was an accepted expression denoting 
compassion and commiseration.
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Blackwell, Smith, and Shrewsbury’s stories indicate another reason 
for people’s ambivalence towards neonaticides: the part played by men 
who had impregnated them. All three claimed to have been ‘betrayed’ by 
men who had promised them marriage but had ‘deluded’, ‘seduced and 
debauched’, and abandoned them instead.44 Men’s responsibility for the 
plight of women who concealed pregnancies, births and deaths of bastards 
problematised the attribution of sole culpability to such women.45 The 
terms of the 1624 Act and the nature of secret birth meant that few fathers 
of victims were prosecuted either as accessories to concealment or as prin-
cipals for murder.46 When they were, they were seldom convicted. Yet 
acquittals did not automatically connote innocence for contemporaries. At 
Taunton, in April 1720, for example, newspapers commented on a man 
who had been acquitted as an accessory to the murder of the bastard child 
he begot on his maidservant, which child he delivered. His servant was 
convicted under the Concealment Act (though reprieved). The newspaper 
declared that acquittal reflected not his innocence but ‘the evidence not 
being sufficient against him’ to convict, ‘notwithstanding which, it is vio-
lently suspected he has been guilty of several of the like Facts’.47
Thomas Brewer’s pamphlet, The Bloudy Mother, dramatised men’s 
duplicity even while condemning Jane Hattersley as a ‘most grace-
less, audacious and impudent beast (too bad to bear the good name of 
woman)’. Hattersley’s lengthy affair with her ‘rank and corrupted’ mas-
ter, Adam Adamson, produced several illegitimate pregnancies, which she 
concealed ‘with loose lacing, tucking and other odd tricks’. She murdered 
the infants; Adamson ‘secretly buried [them] in a grave of his own mak-
ing’. After the murders were exposed, Adamson ‘did very cunningly and 
as closely work on her simplicity’ to save his own neck. Adamson per-
suaded Hattersley to confess that she was solely responsible, telling her 
that her feigned honesty and penitence would so impress judge and jury 
that they would almost certainly acquit her, but that if she were convicted, 
Adamson would easily secure her the King’s pardon. Hattersley was thus 
convicted alone. Even ‘in the last minute of her breath’, Hattersley did 
not denounce Adamson, because he had convinced her that changing her 
story ‘should frustrate her pardon’. In ‘that fear, and hope of life’, with 
the rope around her neck, ‘she gave the hangman six pence to cut her 
down quickly’ so she might only be ‘half dead’ when ‘the pardon would 
come, and save her in that heavy gasping: but her belief was vain, and her 
vain hopes were deceived, for as she deserved she there died’. So it was 
that even a vile, murderous creature was transformed by Brewer into an 
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object of pity as she waited in vain to be saved by the treacherous man 
whom she loved. But Brewer’s tale did not end there. Adamson got his 
comeuppance, suffering providentially from a horrid affliction in which 
worms and lice devoured him alive from the inside out. He died, stinking 
of carrion, within six months. The message was clear: Adamson came to 
the end he deserved, just as Hattersley had.48
dIscovery and dIsMay
Attitudes to neonaticide were informed also by sentiments towards infant 
victims. Early modern people were used to death, especially deaths of 
small children, and to the sight of bodies which were prepared for intern-
ment at home. However, these routine encounters did not inure them to 
the discovery of concealed infant death—not only because of the potential 
sight and smell of crushed, slashed, or rotting corpses but also because of 
the importance placed on both the preparation of bodies for burial and the 
location of graves.49 Unexpectedly finding a newly deceased baby was itself 
disturbing. When Margery Jenkyn ‘out of compassion’ attended to a sick 
neighbour who lived alone in a ‘little hovel’, she ‘put her hands under the 
[bed]clothes to know if she lay warm and looking into the bed’, she saw 
‘a dead child which did so startle her that she cried out’. An eleven-year- 
old girl who was present said that Margery had ‘beat her breast’ as well as 
crying out when she saw the dead child.50
Elsewhere, maidservant Jane Lloyd ‘came running downstairs in great 
terror and fear clapping her hands together saying “Oh Aunt! Aunt! … 
yonder woman’s child is dead!”’.51 Such a shock was exacerbated by one’s 
unpreparedness to find a child there at all, perhaps, but some circum-
stances made discovery particularly dreadful. Two women and some chil-
dren, spying Gwen Griffith oddly scraping and treading down the earth 
on a mountainside, ‘digged up that place with a piece of stick’ and ‘found 
a little blood with a leg and a foot of a dead child’. This so ‘frightened’ 
them, that ‘they threw down the earth again and got two stones and laid 
[them] on it for fear of any dogs or other things to dig it up’. They then 
‘went their ways and told everybody’ that they had found a dead child.52
The jolt of discovery was felt even when people knew what they were 
looking for. The women who found Jane Williams’s baby’s corpse pre-
cisely where she directed them were ‘so terrified and surprised’ that they 
‘did not touch the child at that time’ and left it where it was.53 The ‘sur-
prise’ was that of the early modern sense of being emotionally overcome. 
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Others took up infant corpses immediately they discovered them: Mary 
Walter, seeing a little dog biting and fondling ‘some prey’, upon closer 
inspection discovered a dead child whose leg had been devoured by the 
dog and was so mutilated that it was impossible to determine the baby’s 
sex. She took the child straight to the nearest house, ‘called for the family 
to see it and asked the meaning of it’, after which they returned the corpse 
to the place she had found it and sent for the magistrate and constable.54
While people were willing to extend the benefit of doubt to suspects 
whose babies exhibited no signs of violence having been inflicted, they 
were affected by apparent evidence to the contrary. In 1670, every one 
of the female witnesses described minutely the condition of a dead baby 
discovered within a few hours of its birth: ‘the child’s mouth [was] open 
and some part of its tongue out of its mouth’, with ‘some three stripes 
or strikes on its throat being also blackish, the like sign she had never seen 
on any child’ before. The discoloration—the baby was ‘black and blue’, 
‘blackish about the throat and brownish also’—distinguished this death 
from a natural one, for the ‘child was warm’, which suggested these marks 
were impressed upon it while it was still alive, with ‘its mouth open’ as if it 
were gasping for air or reaching for the breast.55 In 1673, Thomas Davies 
discovered a newborn’s corpse in a flax loft, which ‘had been there so 
long till it stunk’. He brought another manservant to look upon it, who 
asked him what they should do, to which Thomas replied, ‘We will not 
discover [tell] anyone [f]or the curse of anybody shall not fall upon us’. 
Yet when a few days later he saw the girl suspected to be its mother ‘merry 
and laughing’, he told her: ‘You need not be so merry for I have seen the 
dead child’, to which ‘she did not answer anything’.56 People could have 
strong reactions to the corpses of newborns. But those responses, even 
when they led to prosecution, are not best understood simply as part of 
‘a shaming process intended to discipline the sexually illicit woman and 
expose her sin’.57
suspecTs’ subjecTIvITIes
Analyses of infanticide tend to situate the women concerned in a fixed and 
limited emotional landscape: as desperate victims of a patriarchal society 
in which the shame of bearing an illegitimate child compelled them to 
become, as Lawrence Stone put it, ‘the deliberate butcher of her own bow-
els’.58 Sometimes they are presented as protofeminists. Marilyn Francus 
imagined only two subject positions: they were either ‘submissive’ women 
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who internalised the dominant gender ideology and killed their newborns 
to sustain their place within it, or ‘rebellious’ non-maternal ones who vio-
lently dispatched their infants as a rejection of gender norms.59 Either way, 
suspected women seem to be purposeful, goal-oriented agents (and guilty 
of the offence). Yet as Laura Gowing argued, neither concealment of preg-
nancy nor child-killing were necessarily calculated or even fully conscious 
acts.60 In 1713, for instance, Mary Ellis, who gave birth on a mountainside 
on the way to her mother’s house, described being ‘in such agony and in 
a sound [faint] at her delivery, she did not know well whether the child 
was dead or alive’. After ‘she had come to herself ’, she continued on, but 
realising that the child was dead, she being ‘light headed or insensible’ due 
to ‘the great agony which she had at her delivery […,] having found a little 
river she laid it there, she knowing not what she did’.61
Much work on early modern child-killing seems to belie ‘the deep, 
complex and varied individual emotional experiences’ of suspected women 
and girls, just as it has tended to flatten or polarise the responses of their 
contemporaries.62 Scholars often posit a ‘single, isolated subjecthood’ or 
singular ‘subject position’ for suspects, the sort of ‘self ’ that oral historians 
have long rejected.63 I suggest that we seek in these sources not ‘the real 
historical subject’, but rather be sensitive to the multiple subject positions 
that could be assumed by one individual.64
For example, in witness testimony and her own examination in 1716, 
one may perceive at least three subjectivities of Gwen Foulk. The first is 
communicated by a neighbour, Dorothy Williams, who deposed that she 
encountered Gwen ‘uneasy and groaning’ a few yards from a stile on a 
common footpath leading to the highway and asked what ailed her. Gwen 
replied that ‘she had a gnawing about the stomach and heart’ and, then lay 
down unable to go further, asking Dorothy to fetch her sister, who lived 
across the field. The sister being absent, Dorothy returned with Elizabeth 
Salesbury to find Gwen ‘crawling upon her knees and face in an uneasy 
posture upon the grass’. Elizabeth gave Gwen ginger to bite (a remedy for 
stomach ailments). But when Gwen handed it back, the women saw that 
her hand and the grass beneath her were bloody. Suspecting her condi-
tion, they urged her to accompany them ‘to some house and offer[ed] 
their assistance to support her (because she complained she was not able 
to stand)’. Gwen ‘obstinately refuse[d]’. They departed but, lingering 
down the road, observed Gwen ‘throw something from her’ and leave. 
Returning ‘to see what was left there’, they ‘found a child (as they took 
it) covered with the attendants of nature lying in the ditch’. In these 
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 depositions, Gwen is presented from Dorothy’s perspective as an obstinate 
denier of pregnancy and a concealer of childbirth and we may imagine 
how desperate she might have felt in such a predicament. Here, the ‘typi-
cal’ infanticidal mother of the historiography may be seen. The account 
given by Mary Jones, Gwen’s mistress, was somewhat different. Arriving 
home that evening, she found Gwen sitting alone in the dark next to the 
fire. Gwen spoke in such ‘a feeble distressed voice’ that Mary did not at 
first recognise her. Being asked what was wrong, Gwen ‘answered nothing 
but cried’. Dorothy later acquainted Mary with ‘the whole history’ and 
showed her the bloody field and dead child. When Mary asked Gwen why 
she had left the child there, Gwen claimed simply that she had not known 
what it was. This Gwen is abject, isolated, distressed.
A third subject position emerges in Gwen’s own examination: now we 
see a feisty, intelligent girl who is able to deflect the accusations against 
her: she was ‘unprovided with clothes and other necessaries’ for the baby 
because ‘it was but lately that she suspected herself to be with child’; she 
would not have concealed her condition from Dorothy ‘but that the man-
servant was present […] and Elizabeth Salusbury was a person whom her 
master and mistress had no good opinion of’; if Dorothy had been alone, 
she would have told her. She ‘positively denie[d] the child to have had any 
life in him’,
and as circumstances to clear her from having hatched any ill designs, she 
says none of the family was at home, [so] that the mansion house or out-
houses and other fields or by places might have sheltered her better than a 
common public field that had so many footpaths in it and surrounded by 
several highways especially in that part of it which was directly on the path 
near the style and highway, and that she first complained of ailings to […] 
Dorothy before she was asked any questions and laid herself down in her 
presence which she would not have done had she designed to conceal her 
condition.65
What are the implications of discerning Gwen’s multiple selves? We must 
acknowledge that these are not coherent narratives from which we can 
reconstruct fixed, authentic subjectivities. These sources suggest some-
thing of subjectivity in very particular contexts. Of these three ‘Gwens’, 
only one is conveyed through words allegedly spoken by her, and those 
words were, of course, actually those of a clerk who was not required to 
produce a verbatim transcript but to record only as much as was legally 
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relevant.66 However, the subjectivity we meet in Dorothy and Mary’s 
accounts is no more or less ‘authentic’ if we reject a notion of the ‘self ’ 
as a pre-existing entity to be uncovered by brilliant analysis (historical or 
otherwise). Gwen’s experience of giving birth in the field was affected by 
Dorothy, the manservant, and Elizabeth’s presence there; if they had been 
absent, her experience would have been different. Thus, the ‘self ’ we may 
discern in these sources was coproduced in the moment where the parties 
met with all the contextual weight that implies.67
Nor can we position Dorothy and Mary as, respectively, simply con-
demnatory and sympathetic. Dorothy, for all her interfering, testified that 
‘she thought that [the child] had not been alive, for it was so very little and 
unlike children of full age’. Mary, for all her concern, came straight from 
the field where she viewed the infant’s body to the house into Gwen’s 
bed-chamber and confronted her, asking ‘what frolics she played in their 
absence that evening’; yet she too swore she believed the child had been 
stillborn ‘for it had not the full share of flesh as such [newborns] used to 
have but seemed wasted’. How people feel, what they think, how they are 
affected, may change from moment to moment, and we are fortunate to 
have sources that allow us to discern how complicated child death was for 
early modern people, as it is for us.
conclusIon
Let us end where we began, with Jane Williams in 1734. Here, too, we 
can perhaps see that a mere fragment might provide us with some sense of 
emotion that does not rely on our discovering a conscious, fixed subject. 
Alternative subject positions might be simultaneously occupied. Jane’s 
conviction rested primarily on ‘observed marks of violence’ on the baby’s 
throat and neck, ‘the skin being chaffed off as it had been with a hand in 
two several places’. Any violence Jane inflicted, however, sits in tension 
with one way of understanding how she dealt with its body, which speaks 
not just of the extraordinary but also the everyday, not only of violence 
but also possibly of nurturing, not just of death but also, in a way, of life. 
Jane laid her dead baby ‘under a stone under the hen’s nest in a [passage-
way] in her dwelling house’.68 We cannot know whether this was a tem-
porary hiding place or a permanent grave, whether Jane had spent several 
days determining the best place to bury the infant, or whether she laid it 
there in a moment of panic. After all, in February, when the hens were not 
laying, it might seem an attractive location unlikely to be disturbed. Yet 
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whether it was a pragmatic, calculated, panicky or unthinking act, placing 
the body there in that specific spot may nonetheless have some emotional 
meaning.
As Jane went back and forth each day, she would pass her baby, perhaps 
many times. Her baby was not left to the cold under a rock on an isolated 
hillside or thrown in a dung-hill to be unearthed by dogs or swine. Rather 
she placed it carefully under a different stone, which was under a nest, 
which was under an egg, which was under a hen. This baby, whom Jane 
had secretly carried in her womb, but whose birth, whose death, she had 
not acknowledged to a soul, was now perpetually like an egg, kept safe and 
warm by a surrogate mother, and when an egg was taken from the nest, 
very possibly collected by Jane herself, the hen would lay another egg, 
and then another, and so on and on. Thus, in a way, it was as if the baby 
had never been and never would be born, but would always be in a state 
of becoming. Conscious, unconscious or semi-conscious, coldly calculated 
or barely recognised? We cannot know. Jane herself might not have been 
able to tell us. These subject positions are partial, fragmented, and cannot 
be pinned down. But given that we are talking about speech recorded in 
legal contexts, in response to very specific questions, about events that took 
place three hundred or so years ago, then that is surely enough of a gain.
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